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ABSTRACT
Why is the Middle East North Africa region consistently ranked the lowest on the
gender equity scale? This question is quite perplexing and that has driven several
scholarly researchers to investigate the situation of gender and women’s rights within the
states in the region. In this research, I explore the various theories explaining the cause of
gender inequity in this region including the Islam thesis/social modernization theory,
political-economic theory, and psychological/social structural theories, with an emphasis
on the Islamic thesis theory. I argue that the state's support and prioritization of
Muslim/sharia law over federal law is a major contributor to gender inequity within the
Middle East North African states. Tunisia presents a very interesting case where the state
government continuously holds the reins of power with little to no autonomy granted to
the mosques and their leaders despite the proclamation of Islam as the official religion of
the state in the constitution. This thesis research provides a detailed analysis of the form
of state-mosque interrelationships that existed within the different government regimes in
Tunisia. I find that under a structured supervision/control of religious activities by the
state government in Tunisia, gender-equitable policies continue to flourish amid
opposition from religious fundamentalists.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
Gender equity is gradually becoming a topic of discussion in the political,
academic, and social spheres of society. Are we there yet? This is the question on the lips
of many contemporary feminists and gender advocates. According to the World
Economic Forum Global Gap Report 2021, the average distance achieved toward gender
parity globally is 68% (-0.6% lower than 2020) which leads to an estimated 135.6 years
to the attainment of gender equity (World Economic Forum, 2021). It is quite puzzling
that after several centuries of modernization and industrialization, gender equity is still up
for debate and an issue of contention, even in the most developed nations. This thesis
research will take an in-depth look at the gender inequity situation in the Middle East
North Africa (MENA) region by analyzing the Tunisian state-mosque relationship in
different periods and how the relationship impacted women’s status.
In picturing the status of women in MENA, Halim Barakat lists five
characteristics that describe the state of most Arab women by the 20th century. Foremost,
Arab women were segregated and isolated from participating in roles outside of the
domestic sphere and their veiling represented separation. Next, there were not enough
positions available to women to participate in the professional and public spaces apart
from the traditional roles. Also, the personal status codes employed in several MENA
states misappropriate affected women in the areas of marriage, divorce, and ownership of
property. Furthermore, religious beliefs perpetuate women to be evil and deceitful and the
1

standard for morality creates traditional norms for women. Lastly, women are forced to
marry and face several cases of abuse (Barakat, 1993). In the current 21st century, there
are still women living under these conditions in MENA which begs for more attention on
this subject matter.
1.2 Thesis statement
This thesis research argues that states’ support and prioritization of Muslim/sharia
law over federal law is a major contributor to gender inequity within the Middle East
North African states. The objective of my research is twofold. Firstly, my goal is to
emphasize the case of the Tunisian state by examining the degree of power relations
between the state government and Islamic organizations during different strategic periods
in Tunisia’s history. These periods are before Tunisia’s independence, after her
independence (under Habib Bourguiba and Ben Alis’s regime), and the aftermath of the
2011 revolution. Each period presents a unique character of state relationship to Islam
with some leaders reflecting an authoritarian approach to religion and others taking on a
more democratic interface.
The second objective of my thesis is to evaluate the implications of Tunisia’s
state-mosque relationship on gender equity within each period. This objective will help in
providing evidence for my argument by exhibiting when and how women’s rights were
improved or deteriorated around each regime's strong/weak relationship with the
religious bodies. Although Tunisia is among the most developing states on matters
relating to gender equity in MENA, there is still room for improvement and by observing
2

the progress of gender equity in the state under the preceding premise, we can be better
equipped for strategizing for the future.
1.3 Research Approach/Methods
There are several theories and debates by scholars trying to articulate the cause of
gender inequity. One opinion is that the structure of the government consists of an
intentional design to prohibit women from attaining positions of influential power, which
most states seem to possess with a few exceptions. Another debate centers their argument
on the dominance of religious bodies in most states who not only help in supporting a
patriarchal government but also work to persuade their congregation into a state of
gender mediocrity. Some argue that it is just the way things are and that since the dawn of
time, men and women have been unequally “gifted” with different measures of strengths
and intellectual capabilities.
These and several theories surround the debate for gender equity, but the purpose
of this research is the focus is on the theory of Islam thesis/social modernization
(Benstead, 2019). In this thesis research, the region of concentration in the Middle East
North Africa (MENA) region is the region with the largest gap towards gender equity at
60.9% with approximately 142.4 years to close this gap (World Economic Forum, 2021).
Islam also constitutes 93.1% of the religious affiliation of the people of the Middle East
North Africa (Pew Research Center, 2021).
To better explain the role of religiosity in the Middle East North Africa region,
this research will explore a case study of Tunisia, a state that has experienced turbulent
3

regime changes and a revolution against authoritarianism since its independence. The
instrument of measurement for gender equality in these states will be the influence of
Muslim family/sharia laws. The reason for choosing Muslim family law is due to its
continued prioritization over federal law in several states where it concerns the private
and public rights of women.
The research method to be employed in this thesis will be qualitative where
non-numerical data will be collected, analyzed, and interpreted to find the correlation
between religion and gender equity in Middle East North Africa. These sources of data
will include secondary documents, first-hand/participant observations, questionnaires,
interviews, videos, audio recordings, etc. The goal of using the qualitative research
method for this study is to get an in-depth understanding and a historical background of
each period in Tunisia by employing a story-like perspective or narration that takes the
reader through a journey of the times and changes in the state.
1.4 Research Structure and Work Plan
The first chapter of this research will serve as a preliminary outline of the thesis
research which will include the introduction, problem statement, thesis statement,
research design, and the structure of the thesis work. The second chapter is the literature
review which will involve engagement with literary sources regarding the thesis topic.
The theories surrounding gender equity in the Middle East North Africa will be explored
with emphasis on the religious argument, as well as an analysis of the historical context
of gender equality within the region.
4

Chapter three houses the research methodology where I will describe the structure
of the qualitative data collection which consists of sources of data such as speeches, book
publications, journals, articles, interviews, blogs, government statistics, encyclopedias,
etc. The fourth chapter includes the presentation of the Tunisian case study where I
describe the state-mosque relations through the different periods and regimes and the
outlook of gender equity and women’s rights within each of these periods. The last
chapter is the conclusion of the research, findings/discussion, and pathway for future
research.
This thesis topic is very compelling and important because I believe that to
proffer a solution, you must first identify where the problem areas are. The questions this
thesis seeks to answer will shine a light on the status of women in the middle east by
highlighting where women have been, where they are now, and possibly the future status
they may hold given the right circumstances. By observing the Tunisian case study, this
thesis paper will help to provide a baseline for future analysis of other MENA states. This
research will also provide a better understanding of state-mosque relations and how it
affects the gender status of women in MENA. Like most research works, this thesis paper
will be an important contribution to the field of gender studies and serve as a reference
for social science students in their prospective research works.

5

CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW
Religion and gender are both strongly debated fields and while there is robust
scholarly research on these topics, the connection between them is frequently overlooked.
I attribute this major ignorance to the spirited nature of the debates and their supporters
who oftentimes are very rigid in their opinions and neglect to consider the opposing
debate. In contrast to this narrative, this research will observe the crucial significance of
religion as it relates to gender in MENA from an open and accommodative perspective.
To begin this literature review, I will present a background on the history of patriarchy
with emphasis on the role of religion in creating and maintaining the patriarchal order.
Next, I will highlight the progression of gender equity and contemporary feminism by
explaining the instruments of advancement. Furthermore, there will be a concentration on
the status of women in MENA and the contributing factors that shape gender in these
states. Lastly, this research will take a deep dive into the theories surrounding the causes
of gender inequity in MENA.
There is an ongoing debate between gender equality and gender equity and while
they are related terms, they constitute different meanings. Gender equality simply put is
the equal outcome for all including women, men, and people of diverse gender
backgrounds while gender equity can be seen as the process of attaining gender equality.
Hence, we can say that gender equality is the end goal and gender equity, is the
process/instrument. For this research, I have chosen to adopt the term “gender equity”
rather than “gender equality” due to the purpose and scope of the thesis centered on the
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determination of the problem and solution-finding. I believe this thesis approach is most
appropriate to the definition of gender equity largely appropriated.
2.1 The Patriarchal History
One factor that often comes up with gender equity studies is “Patriarchy”, as it is
often seen as the perpetrator of gender inequity in many societies. Patriarchy, directly
translated, means “the rule of the father” and its origins stem from the Greek word
“patriarkhēs” (Ferguson Kathy, 1999). Since the dawn of time women have been
considered the lesser gender and, in most cultures, patriarchy exists where men are more
likely than women to hold positions of power in the political, economic, and social
spheres.
One argument for the prevalence of male-dominated societies is called “Patrilocal
residence” which proposes that men tend to live most of their lives in the communities
they were born into while women are likely to move away due to marriage and the
responsibility of taking care of in-laws (Ananthaswamy & Douglas, 2019). This narrative
on patrilocal residence was further supported by the arrival of agriculture and
homesteading which required territories to be protected by physically stronger males and
the property was passed down the male lineage (Bob Holmes, 2015).
Friedrich Engels in “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State”,
further supports this school of thought as he credits the origin of patriarchy to the
emergence of private property, which is most often managed by men (Engels, 2000). The
women, in Engels’s perspective, were restricted to the domestic sphere where their duties
7

were childbirth, child nurturing, and household chores. This patriarchal structure was
constructed and perpetuated by the men to maintain control of property and ensure that
the family property was passed down to their male offspring (Engels, 2000).
Matriarchy on the other hand is a social system or structure where women oversee
the major power positions in politics, societal privileges, moral authority, and
land/property rights (Wikipedia, 2022). In most matriarchal societies, the oldest female or
the mother is the head of the family, and the generational lineage and property are passed
down through the female line. According to Banerjee Rooplena’s “Matriarchy and
Contemporary Khasi Society”, the concept of matriarchy materialized from European
thinkers in the 19th century (2015). Banerjee cites Swiss anthropologist, Johann Jakob
Bachofen (1861), who claims that matriarchy emerged from the social order of hetaerism
(unregulated sexuality and female powerlessness) and that women rebelled against this
and took control of political power. Bachofen and other thinkers maintain that men took
over the power of women and instituted patriarchy (Gershon, 2020).
As reported by Sheena Joseph (2019) for Beyond Pink World, there are 8
matriarchal societies with predominantly matrilineal lineages around the world. Based on
the report, these matriarchal societies include Minangkabau In Indonesia, Bribri In Costa
Rica, Khasi In India, Mosuo In China, Nagovisi In New Guinea, Akan In Ghana, Umoja
In Kenya, and Garo In India (Joseph, 2019). Of these matrilineal societies, none are
found in the Middle East North Africa region, as several states in the region practice and
abide by a patriarchal system of rulership and control of the property.
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Patriarchy in the Middle East has been deemed to be a result of an elite or family
phenomenon. By observing and measuring various factors such as celibacy, exogamy,
endogamy, and a diverse number of marriages across isolated lineages, Linda
Schatkowski Schilcher (1988) asserts that patriarchy in the Middle East is a family
pattern connected to each family’s developmental cycle over the years. She proposes that
Middle Eastern patriarchy was prominent in the early modern period and began with a
patriarchal outlook which then transformed into a more egalitarian society and reversed
the rights of men by introducing the roles women performed in their communities
(Schilcher, 1988).
2.2 Measures of gender equity
While discussing gender regimes and the influence of the European Union on
gender inequity, Sylvia Walby (2004) analyses various models of theorizing gender
equity as constructed by scholars over the years. She faults the models for considering a
single-dimensional approach to understanding gender equity where one important
element is considered as the cause for gender inequity. For example, Wobbe (2003)
emphasizes the value of norms/codes in explaining the transitioning of legal procedures
in courts as it relates to the employment rights of women.
Another example of the single-dimensional model cited by Walby is the male
breadwinner/dual-earner system by Lewis Jane (1992) and in her analysis, the essential
feature she employs is the degree that which family forms appeal to women as
housewives, homemakers, or domestic workers (Walby, 2004). There are several other
9

essential elements used in conducting a single-dimensional model of gender equity such
as the sexual violence model (Brownmiller, 1976), female disposition to the domestic
sphere (Rosaldo, 1974), heterosexuality model (MacKinnon 1989), domestic method of
production (Delphy, 1984) and others.
The countermodel that Walby proposes is the creation of a theoretical model for
exploring gender relations as a regime or system involving a certain number of essential
elements (Walby, 2004). In her model of gender regime, she employs four critical levels
of abstraction namely, regime, two-dimensional forms of gender regime, domains of
gender regime (economic, polity, and civil society), and social practices levels. Her
argument for this approach is that it is more efficient to determine the varying number of
inequities when gender relations are viewed as a part of a gender regime/system rather
than an order of individual occurrences (Walby, 2004).
While Walby’s approach has its benefits, I disagree that the single-dimensional
approach to observing gender equity is essentially reductionist in that it fails to capture
other key elements. I believe that gender equity is very fluid and takes a different shape
based on the conditions and characteristics of the environment. It is the task of political
philosophers to determine the factors surrounding gender equity by determining the
conditions unique to each geographical location and utilizing them in understanding the
how, why, and when of the phenomena.
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2.3 Reasons for the advancement of gender equity
Over the years, we have experienced the advancement of industrialization,
technology, and internationalism across the globe which has transformed gender roles in
most societies both positively and negatively. Industrialization and technological
advancements have evolved careers in the way work is done, location of work, and
sectors where work is done (Rima, 2020). It has created a larger workforce that cannot be
maintained by a single-gendered working-class society. Hence, there has been an increase
in the female workforce that keeps growing every year, and a larger number of women in
higher institutions of education. The influence of colonial powers in developing countries
and the ever-present neo-colonialist pursuits also has a significant role in shaping gender
norms.
According to the 2021 Global Gap Gender Report, there has been an increase in
the gender parity gap which is currently at 68.6%. In the United States (US), the number
of women in the workforce has doubled from 34% in 1950 to nearly 57% in 2016
(Weinstein, 2018). In MENA, we have also witnessed a few states that have exhibited a
significant increase in women’s labor participation over the years. In Saudi Arabia, the
Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) has risen from 17.7% in 2016 to 33.2% in 2020
(Alkhowaiter, 2021) and the female unemployment rate has reduced from 32 to 24
percent (Tamayo et. al, 2021) after decades of belonging to one of the countries with the
lowest female participation rate. Many attributes this surge to the private sector
employment growth and reform programs such as; permitting women to drive vehicles
and changes to guardianship, labor, and family laws (Tamayo et. al, 2021).
11

Several MENA countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait
also have women participating in the workforce at rates that are on par with other
countries in the world. The UAE LFPR experienced an increase from 51.04% in 2015 to
53.41% in 2018, and Kuwait increased from 25.49% in 2015 to 26.29% in 2017 with a
slight 0.02 decline in 2018 (Macro Trends, 2021). Despite these promising LFPR rates
among these states, MENA is still particularly flagged as one of the most female
underrepresented regions in the world. While the LFPR in MENA is comparable to other
regions, the female rate is significantly lower at 24.6% compared to the average of 47.8%
globally (Assi & Marcati, 2020).
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Figure 1 - Labor Force, Female (% of Total Labor Force) – the Middle East &
North Africa

Table 1 - Labor Force, Female (% of Total Labor Force) – the Middle East & North
Africa
Country

Most Recent Year

Most Recent Value

Algeria

2019

19.9

Bahrain

2019

20.1

Djibouti

2019

39.9
13

Egypt, Arab Rep.

2019

20.6

Iran, Islamic Rep.

2019

19.4

Iraq

2019

13.4

Israel

2019

47.6

Jordan

2019

18.3

Kuwait

2019

25.1

Lebanon

2019

24.5

Libya

2019

34.1

Malta

2019

41.9

Morocco

2019

24.3

Oman

2019

15.4

Qatar

2019

13.6

Saudi Arabia

2019

15.8

Syrian Arab Republic

2019

16.7

Tunisia

2019

27.4

United Arab Emirates

2019

17.5

West Bank and Gaza

2019

20.3

Yemen, Rep.

2019

7.9

*Source: The World Bank Group (2022) - Derived using data from International Labor
Organization, ILOSTAT database.
Another sector that reflects the status of gender equity in MENA is Education
levels among females. An increase in the attainment of education in any region has a
14

ripple effect that leads to a higher age for getting married, reduced fertility rates, change
in the family structure, and a shift in goals, perceptions, and attitudes towards life. Over
the last six decades, educational levels have significantly risen but there is still a wide
trail of female literacy levels compared to the males in MENA (Moghadam, 2019).
Moghadam (2019) also highlights the structural inequalities perpetuated by

educational institutions in MENA. For one, there are socio-economic class distinctions
present in educational institutions where only the wealthy few have access to quality
education which further supports the social structure. Moghadam cites Bradley Cook’s
argument that the Egyptian educational institutions are comprised of an elite minority that
supports secular education meanwhile most of the Egyptian population leans towards the
appeal for larger participation of Islam in public education (Moghadam, 2019). Another
form of social inequality supported by educational institutions is the distinction of
education based on gender where males are given preference over females. For example,
in Saudi Arabia, sex segregation in education is very common and before 2002, the
education of females was controlled by the Islamic institutions instead of the ministries of
education (Moghadam, 2019).

15

Table 2 - Selected Socioeconomic Indicators in the Middle East and North Africa

PERCENT OF
POPULATION
OVER AGE 15
WHO ARE
ILLITERATE,
2000

NUMBER OF
PEOPLE
OVER AGE 15
WHO ARE
ILLITERATE
(THOUSANDS
), 2000

PERCENT OF
POPULATION
AGES 15 TO
24 WHO ARE
ILLITERATE,
2000

NUMBER OF
PEOPLE
AGES 15 TO
24 WHO ARE
ILLITERATE
(THOUSANDS
), 2000

FEMA
LE

MA
LE

FEMA
LE

MA
LE

FEMA
LE

MA
LE

FEMA
LE

MA
LE

Middle
East
and
North
Africa

42

22

50,057

26,671

23

11

8,585

4,573

Algeria

43

24

4,211

2,360

16

7

530

227

Bahrain

17

9

32

25

1

2

1

1

Egypt

56

33

12,253

7,374

37

24

2,500

1,678

Iran

31

17

6,696

3,819

9

4

655

296

Iraq

77

45

5,070

3,057

71

41

1,593

962

Jordan

16

5

220

78

1

1

3

5

Kuwait

20

16

103

130

7

8

15

19

Lebano
n

20

8

246

91

7

3

23

9
16

Libya

32

9

533

168

7

0.5

43

1

Morocc
o

64

38

6,286

3,702

42

24

1,265

750

Oman

38

20

246

155

4

0.5

9

1

Palestin
e*

16

6

136

48

—

—

—

—

Qatar

17

20

21

57

3

7

1

3

Saudi
Arabia

33

17

1,723

1,092

10

5

187

101

Syria

40

12

1,879

566

21

5

376

85

Tunisia

39

19

1,307

621

11

3

106

27

Turkey

24

7

5,453

1,539

6

1

392

81

United
Arab
Emirate
s

21

25

117

345

6

13

10

29

Yemen

75

33

3,525

1,444

54

17

874

292

*Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Literacy Statistics” (www.uis.unesco.org,
accessed March 11, 2003); United Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report 2002; UN Statistics Division, The World’s Women 2000: Trends
and Statistics (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/ww2000/table5d.htm, accessed
Aug. 23, 2003); F. Roudi-Fahimi, “Women’s Reproductive Health in the Middle East and
North Africa” (2003); and C. Haub, 2003 World Population Data Sheet.
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The influence of Family Law and Sharia Law is one major factor that cannot be
overlooked when it comes to examining gender equity, particularly in MENA. There are
several areas in the region, particularly in the poorer countries (i.e. Yemen), where
conservation family laws are supreme and classic/private patriarchy is still strongly in
practice. According to Moghadam;
“Classic patriarchy” or “private patriarchy” has been dissolving under the
weight of modernization and development, but we continue to see the patriarchal
legacy in both the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of states,
markets, and organizations. The patriarchal legacy is seen in practices such as
the adolescent marriage of girls, son preference, compulsory veiling, cousin
marriage, sexual control of females, and “honor killings. It is also inscribed in
family laws that increasingly are regarded as anachronistic by much of the female
population and activist generation” (Moghadam, 2019).
In states such as Iran and Jordan, there is the authority given to the male guardian
to prevent or discontinue the female, within his control, from gaining employment or
keeping a job (Moghadam, 2019). From major life decisions such as marriage, education,
and employment down to comportment in public, dressing, travel, and choice of
association; the male guardian has the final say. Patriarchal honor is also dependent on
the sexual conduct of the female family members, and this has resulted in a great number
of honor killings i.e. the murder of a family member who has disgraced the family; in the
region.

18

From a legal standpoint, the Muslim family laws also take precedence in most
MENA regions. A female’s testimony in court is not sufficient, notwithstanding her
literacy, except if it is supported by another man or woman. Meanwhile when a man
testifies in court, clarification or support is not needed (Moghadam, 2019). The courts are
also more favorable to the male than the female gender regarding property and divorce
rights. When a man dies, his male kin inherits most of his wealth and property, not his
wife or daughters.
According to the account of two Saudi Arabian teens, Nourah and Shahad,
Nourah stated that “ale from my family can control my life in any way. He can make the
big decisions in my life including my partner, the future of my education, even if I went to
the hospital, he had to sign for me”. Echoing after her are the words of Shahad; “My life
in Saudi Arabia was like a slave since I was a little girl. I couldn’t do anything without
the permission from my male guardian. My father was an abusive man” (McNeill et. al
2019). This is the agony of two teens out of the thousands of others in Saudi Arabia and
the MENA region. Several of them have tried to escape from this oppression by seeking
asylum in non-Arab states but in most cases, their passports get seized, they are detained
and placed in rehabilitation centers (which in reality is a sort of prison) until their male
guardians deem it fit for them to be released; ironically the same male guardians they are
seeking to escape from.
Despite these criticisms of Islamic family Laws, Lisa Blaydes argues that while
most scholars blame Islamic groups for propagating patriarchal systems which support
the men to the detriment of women, Islamist rule provides social services for women;
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particularly in the area of reproductive health (Blaydes 2014, 489). She comes to this
conclusion by analyzing two areas in Greater Cairo where one was controlled by militant
Islamist groups while the other was ruled by strong men. She found that Islamic activists
in Islamic governed areas were very committed to providing reproductive and other
health services to women, especially those who were poor (Blaydes 2014, 504).
Another counterargument supporting this is that most of the oppressive practices
and customs are a result of local cultural traditions, not Islam (PBS, 2020). For example,
they argue that the veiling of Arab women goes back to the 17th century, before Islam
arrived, where veils were worn by Byzantine and Persian women as a symbol of high
societal status (PBS, 2020). The Quran also advocates for gender equality because it
states that women and men are equal in God’s eyes, and it stipulates several provisions
for women's rights. Some of these provisions include the abolishment of female
infanticide, equal education for both genders, female right to her choice of husband,
divorce and property rights, and advocacy for monogamy; although polygamy is
permitted (PBS, 2020).
Several prominent Muslim female political actors and personalities are also cited
in the counterargument that patriarchal Muslim family laws do not cause female
underrepresentation- particularly citing female relatives to the Prophet Muhammed who
were quite notable in their time. One of them is Aisha, Muhammed’s favorite wife who
had significant political influence and fought at the battle of Camel (PBS, 2020). Another
notable female cited is Khadija, the first wife of the prophet, who was a powerful woman
and the first to convert to Islam. She also hired the prophet and proposed marriage to him
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despite being way older (PBS, 2020). Others cited include Queen Amina of Zaria,
Nigeria; Shajarat al-Durr, Sultan of Mamluk Egypt; Razia, ruler of 13th century India,
and several others.
2.4 Theories Examining the Causes of Gender Inequity in the Middle East
These staggering statistics beg the question of why MENA is significantly behind
other regions of the world when it comes to gender equity. Several scholars and theorists
have attempted to provide answers to explain and understand the gender equity situation
in MENA. Prominent schools of thought on this issue include but are not limited to;
religious theory, economic theory, and social/cultural theory.
2.4.1 Islam Thesis/Social Modernization Theories
Islamic Fundamentalism is one of the most symbolic/compelling movements that
erupted in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Its influence is largely in the
Middle East region, African and Asian continents, where women’s rights are abused, and
their freedoms restricted on the grounds of anti-western culture/practices (Meade &
Wiesner, 2006). Other forms of religious fundamentalism where male and female roles
are strictly laid down appear in Christian, Hindu, and Jewish religions.
In the Middle East North Africa, we find that a good majority of the population is
religious and of this majority, Islam is the most dominant faith (Pew Research Center,
2021). According to the analysis of the Pew-Templeton Project on “Global Religious
Futures”, nine out of ten (93%) Middle East North Africans belong to the Muslim
religious sect in 2010, and a predicted 0.2 increase over the coming decades. Staggering
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behind the next most populous religion is Christianity at 4%, followed by the Jewish
population at 1.6%, and other religions (including but not limited to Hindus, Buddhists,
traditional worship, papers, and non-religious identifying people) constitute less than 1%
of the population (Pew Research Center, 2021).
As a result of religious fundamentalism and persisting gender norms in the Middle
East North Africa region, there are several social that women face that go unchecked due
to the symbolism placed on women. According to Blaydes and Linzer (2008),
fundamentalism is the “sociopolitical movement that requires from its members a strict
adherence to specified fundamentals or doctrines; and that claims for its motivation in
doing so a divine, or otherwise transcendentally grounded, mandate”. This religious
fundamentalism has led some families to place women as ‘symbols of virtue’, which
means that women have a certain code of conduct/behavior to uphold and failure to do so
brings shame and scorn to the society on the family.
The effect of this is that we see several cases of honor killings in the MENA
region. This means that the disobedient or nonconforming female is killed as a way of
cleansing the family and restoring dignity to the family name. Religious fundamentalism
in the region has led several people to see modern culture (dressing, music, education,
etc.) as a deviation from the pioneer Muslim practices, and women are forced into
compulsory veiling, prevented from attending social gatherings or association,s and even
gaining an education.
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With this analysis and theories in mind, it is perspicuous that religion plays a vital
role in the day-to-day lives of people in MENA. From the lens of a social scientist, it is
prudent to make a correlation between the prevalence of religion and the gender inequity
situation in the region. In the subsequent chapters, I will be conducting some tests using
qualitative data from Tunisia’s institutional periods as case studies to determine the
connection between the strict family/sharia laws and how it factors to either support or
diminish the attainment of gender equity within the MENA region.
2.4.2 Political Economic Theories
Another theory that evaluates the issue of gender inequity in MENA is the
political-economic/sociological theory. The political-economic theory is concerned with
analyzing the connection that exists between the patriarchal institutions in MENA and
how they influence inequities in female labor force participation (Benstead, 2019). One
resource that stands out and cannot be overlooked when analyzing the economy of the
MENA is Oil. One-third of the World’s oil production is created in MENA and countries
including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates are
amongst the World’s largest contributors of fossil fuels (Puri-Mirza, 2021). Most of these
oil-producing states in MENA also belong to the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), which helps with establishing quotas and oil prices among
its member states.
While the discovery of oil in MENA has unequivocally made these Arab nations
wealthy, it has also contributed to corruption among MENA leaders, reduction in
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economic diversity, and perpetuation of gender bias/patriarchal structures. According to
Ross Michael (2008), the immense influence of oil dependency in the economy of
MENA states creates inequalities towards female participation in the labor force. This is a
result of an occupational shift from a tradeable to a non-tradable sector that favors jobs
such as construction which is less encouraging to female employees causing higher rates
of unemployment among females and an under-representation in parliament and
governing positions (Ross, 2008).
Benstead also outlines another political-economic/sociological theory as proposed
by Mounira M. Charred, which proposes that patriarchal family laws can be understood
through the presence of tribes that are strongly supported by the ruling party or
incumbent’s desire to garner political support (Benstead, 2019). According to Charrad, a
tribe is, “a political entity, bound by shared conceptions of patrilineal kinship serving as
a basis for solidarity, and oriented toward the collective defenses of itself as a group”
(Charrad, 2001). Hence, patriarchal laws are predominantly found where there are strong
tribal ties and the predominance of these patrilineal tribes in MENA is responsible for the
structuring and maintenance of family laws which influences gender equity in the region
(Benstead, 2019).
2.4.3 Psychological/Social Structural Theories
The argument for the psychological/social structural theory is that to
explain/understand gender equity it is critical to study the social bias and networks that
exist in the world, irrespective of cultural/structural background (Benstead, 2019). As
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described by Benstead there are two theories supporting the psychological/social
structure theory, namely; the gender role congruity theory proposed by Eagly et.al and
the theories of homosociality by Bjarnegård Elin (2013).
The gender role congruity theory examines the stereotypical gender norms around
women and how it is connected to the requirements for leadership (Benstead, 2019). In
many early societies and several contemporary communities, women are often relegated
to the responsibility of being the perfect homemaker due to physical and emotional traits
which make women more adroit at handling domestic affairs. Men on the other hand are
stereotyped as possessing physical and mental strength which gives them the upper hand
on matters about governance and politics. The gender role congruity theory highlights
that these stereotypes are major contributors to women being excluded from political
positions and facing opposition during elections (Benstead, 2019).
The theory of homosociality explains gender inequity from the perspective of the
numerical supremacy of men in politics and how male dominance is maintained in this
sphere through the expanding networks of their gender (Benstead, 2019). There is a
paucity of “homosocial capital” where women do not have an interconnected network or
a sizable number of connections, they can tap into to win elections. This absence in turn
leads to poor funding, campaign support, media coverage, and other electoral necessities
which a network provides making it difficult for women to occupy political offices and
gain admission to use government services for policy formulation/implementation
(Benstead, 2019). Hence, just like the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, men
keep ruling and women keep being marginalized.
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CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For this study, I will be analyzing the impact of religiosity on gender equity in the
MENA, particularly how state-mosque relations work to impede or expedite the progress
of women in the region. With this aim in mind, my dependent variable is gender equity in
MENA and my independent variable is the state-mosque relations within the region. My
argument/thesis statement for this study is that states’ support and prioritization of
Muslim/sharia law over federal law is a major contributor to gender inequity within the
Middle East North African states.
The method of analysis for this thesis research is principally a qualitative analysis
approach using a comparative case study method of testing and the descriptive
examination of the status of gender equity within each time frame. In the next chapter, I
will conduct a comparative study of different eras in Tunisia, employing each period as
my unit of analysis. By structuring my data in this format, I will be able to provide a rich
narrative of state-mosque relations in Tunisia by taking my readers on a journey through
the history of instrumental political leaders in Tunisia and observing how females fared
under each fundamentalist and/or modernist structured regime.
This method of research/analysis is not unfamiliar in this field of study. Mounira
Charrad applies a similar approach to explaining how Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco
made different choices regarding the rights of women and family law after each gained
independence (Charrad, 2001). In Charrad’s “States and Women’s rights; The making of
Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco”, she utilizes a comparative-historical
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approach gleaned from John Stuart Mill's “Method of Difference” by choosing case
studies (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) that have a similar background but with differing
outcomes concerning family law (Charrad, 2001). In other words, Tunisia, Algeria, and
Morocco have several similarities such as the religion of Islam, French colonial
occupation, Kinship/tribal structures, and Arabian cultures, but they all took different
approaches to their family law policies.
In my research, rather than use states as my case study like Charrad does, I
instead make use of periods as my unit of comparison. My case studies include; postindependence Tunisia, pre-independence Tunisia, and Tunisia after the 2011 revolution.
The post-independence case study refers to the period when Tunisia was still under
French colonial rule and had not achieved self-sustenance as a state. The preindependence phase in Tunisia was after it achieved independence in 1956 and under the
authoritarian style government of Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The final case study
surrounds the state of Tunisia after the 2011 revolution including the struggle for power
between the Islamic fundamentalists and modernists, and the rise of women's
activism/movements. The intention behind the analysis of these case studies is the
highlight of my hypothesis earlier stated.
Hence, this research takes on a deductive reasoning methodology as the
hypothesis of my thesis is inspired by the thoughts and theories of various scholars who
share similar ideas on the topic of religion and gender equity, particularly in MENA.
Some of these include Charrad, Moghadam, Benstead, and others. Hence, my deductive
reasoning approach stands on the grounds, theories, and assumptions of previous scholars
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to discover supporting or contradicting evidence on how the changing state-mosque
relationship could evolve the status of gender equity in MENA. To further clarify, this
research hypothesis is not aimed at developing a theory but rather at testing the existing
theory surrounding this topic area.
The major point of data in my thesis study is the literary works of authors in the
field of gender equity in the Middle East. Due to the qualitative rather than quantitative
approach to my research, the focus is to create a rich narrative that captures the important
details relevant to my subject matter, and to achieve this, providing a historical context is
very imperative. This historical data and comprehensive narrative include primarily
secondary sources of data such as speeches, book publications, journals, articles,
interviews, blogs, government statistics, encyclopedias, etc.
The works of Donker and Netterstrom (1988), Mounira Charrad (2001, 2011), and
Marion Boulby (2017) were very instrumental in establishing my historical narrative of
the different periods in Tunisia. Boulby in “The Islamic challenge; Tunisia after
independence” included excerpts of speeches and interviews of the former President
Bourguiba which is a big support to the narrative as it brings us closer to understanding
the personality of Bourguiba and it influenced his policy mandates during his rule.
Donker and Netterstrom take a very detailed approach when examining statemosque relationships and the struggle for balance between reformative and Islamic
revivalist parties. One feature that stands out in their writing is their analysis of the
Tunisian constitution and contention for more and less Islamic autonomy in the
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constitutional text. It is very interesting to note that one clause which has withstood the
test of time, despite regime changes, is the Article 1 proclamation that Islam is the
religion of Tunisia.
There are several journals, articles, reports, and blogs that contributed strategic
data to my research. The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) report on “The Women's Rights
Champion. Tunisia's potential for furthering women's rights” by Norbakk provided data
on women’s agitation for gender equity and the rise of women's rights organizations in
Tunisia. The US Department of State (2021) 2020 Report on “International Religious
Freedom: Tunisia” provides a welcome background into the character of the state and
mosque relations in modern-day Tunisia. The value of these sources of data (i.e. journals,
articles, and blogs) lies in their specification and attention to detail. Usually, there is one
or a few issues in contention and it is analyzed with relevant statistics to
approve/disapprove of the reigning opinion on the subject matter.
One of the major benefits of applying qualitative data sources to my research is
that it provides the descriptive and detailed information that is essential to my research. I
believe that narration and analysis of past events provide more detail and while writing
about the periods in Tunisia, I found that books, journals, articles, etc. provided me with a
story-like description that quantitative sources could not. It is also important to note that
quantitative data (i.e surveys, questionnaires, opinion polls, etc.) does not always have
historical information as most organizations collecting and conducting had not been
established. For instance, the Arab Barometer was established in 2005 and might not
provide data on relevant events that occurred in 20th century Tunisia.
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A concern I encountered with a qualitative source of data is that it can sometimes
be opinionated or subjective to reflect and support the ideology of the writer which
unintentionally takes away the neutrality of the information. For example, a writer that
believes in Islamic fundamentalism (strict and literal interpretation of the Quran) is more
likely to analyze data, concerning a leader who de-autonomic the mosques, from a critical
standpoint. The benefit to this is that critical review still contains important information
no less and it helps readers to study text from a perspective, not often considered.
Fact-finding might also prove difficult when conducting a comparative historical
analysis. Although included in my research is a rich narrative on the individual periods in
Tunisia, there are not enough numerical/statistical indicators to be able to provide a
mathematical conclusion that provides certainty on my findings. Most of my findings and
conclusions are based on deductive/derivable perspectives gleaned from the narrative
provided by this research and field of study in general.
To measure gender equity in Tunisia within each period, I analyzed the
strengths/weaknesses of each regime’s state-mosque relations. In other words, I observed
the degree to which the state delegated power to religious institutions and the amount of
autonomy the mosque had to perform its activities and practice Sharia/family law in those
times. An instance of this form of measurement can be found in Donker and
Netterstrom’s (1988) analysis of the struggle between the mosque and the state from
Habib Bourguiba’s regime till the aftermath of Tunisia's 2011 revolution.
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Apart from the approach applied in this research, there are various ways of
measuring gender equity. According to Catherine Caruso (2020) of the Global Citizen,
there were four major approaches used to measure gender equity by the Global Gender
Gap report. They include political empowerment, economic participation and
opportunity, educational attainment, and health and survival. Other approaches proposed
include the use of public opinion surveys with the help of research networks like the Arab
Barometer and World Value Survey which provides insight into the political, social, and
economic perception of the people based on certain indicators. According to Benstead
(2019), there are several popular indicators for gender equity that are distinguished based
on private and public rights. The private rights include the family code and several
gender rights available in a country. Public rights include women’s labor force
participation, the percentage of people holding egalitarian views, the percentage of
women in the House of Representatives including the date of the most recent election,
and the national parliamentary gender quota.
During this research, I have employed a number of these indicators in analyzing
gender status in Tunisia within the different periods. Family code, women’s rights
policies/reforms, educational attainment for females, and women’s labor force
participation are some of the many indicators to show the growth or decline of gender
status in my research. I also analyzed constitutional provisions for women over the years
as reflected in each amendment and the rise of women’s mass movement and
organizations in Tunisia.
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CHAPTER FOUR - CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
Before expanding my argument that states’ support and prioritization of
Muslim/sharia law over federal law is a major contributor to gender inequity within the
Middle East North African states, using a comparative period analysis, I wish to begin by
providing an overview of each of my period case studies. The purpose of this overview is
to shed light on what structure of state-mosque interrelationship existed within the
different government regimes in Tunisia. This will ensure that the study is wholesome
and that there is a background that accommodates readers with little or no experience
with the subject matter.
The Middle East North African states have particularly struggled to maintain a
balance between the control and power of the government and that of the Islamic
institutions. This struggle is further exacerbated by the intertwining of Islamic laws with
political propaganda and vice versa. For instance, several “Islamists” such as Al-Qaeda
and the Muslim Brotherhood have pursued several political agendas/ideologies in their
approach to influencing the government (Donker & Netterstrøm, 2017). Also, several
political aspirants and incumbents have supported Islamic institutions and laws to attain
certain privileges such as higher votes, support from the Islamic communities, funding,
etc. This has often made the state-mosque relations in MENA states fluctuate based on
the regime in power and the influence of Islamists in these regions (Donker &
Netterstrom, 2017).
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To effectively examine state-mosque relations in Tunisia and further my
previously stated argument, this case study analysis will look at the qualitative data
available within these different periods that analyses the status of gender equity such as
level of education, women’s participation in the labor force, child marriage rates, etc. The
results of the data will explain if gender equity was highest or lowest when state-mosque
relations in Tunisia were strong or weakened within these periods.
4.2 Civic and Sharia Laws in Tunisia
The constitution of Tunisia clearly states that Islam is the country’s official
religion, and it also specifies that the president must be a Muslim. Despite its declaration
as an Islamic nation, the constitution of Tunisia maintains that it is a civil state and the
government should serve as guardians of religion to prevent the propagation of political
intentions or aspirations within the mosques and other religious centers (U.S Department
of State, 2021). The constitution also prescribes that mosques and other places of worship
should not be partisan in nature. The fundamental rights of the people are also protected
within the constitution including the freedom of conscience, belief, and the right to
individual choice of religious worship (U.S Department of State, 2021). For the most
part, the government has command over the mosques, and they subsidize them and have
the responsibility of paying wages to the Muslim leaders. Tunisia also observes four
religious holidays in its calendar, namely; Eid al-Adha, Eid al-Fitr, Muharram, and
Mawlid.
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While the laws of the government and Islamic laws often overlap in Tunisia, it is
important to note that the rulings of the government override the Islamic laws in most
cases. In Tunisia, the building of mosques is required to conform to the state's urban
planning guidelines, and once completed, the mosque is considered the property of the
government and is tasked with ensuring its maintenance. Religion also has a fundamental
influence on the education sector of Tunisia. For instance, private education institutions
can be managed by religious bodies and in public schools, students are mandated to
attend principles of Islam courses while non-Muslim students may seek an exemption but
still participate in other religious courses works that include Christianity and Judaism
(U.S Department of State, 2021).
In Tunisia, when it comes to issues regarding marriage, dissolution of marriage,
separation, and other personal status issues, the civic laws are integrated with the
fundamentals of the sharia laws, such as the law of property ownership and inheritance.
Before a marriage union, intended couples must first decide how their assets are going to
be managed and if they will be deemed as shared or joint assets. In several cases, Sharia
law affords males a considerable portion of properties, and children of marriages between
non-Muslim men and women are still considered Muslim by the government, and the
children are prohibited by the government to acquire inheritance passed down from their
mothers (U.S Department of State, 2021).
As identified by Donker and Netterstrom (2017), many scholars in the social
science field have not paid close attention to understanding how Islam and religion,
essentially how political struggles structure the state-mosque relations and power
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dynamics in Muslim predominant states. To avoid this oversight in my thesis research, I
will identify a couple of stages that have been influential in shaping Tunisia’s history and
analyze how the state-mosque relations have been and have evolved to their current state.
The three stages that I will consider in this section are the pre-independence stage, postindependence stage, and the Tunisian revolution.
4.3 Pre-Independence State-mosque Relations in Tunisia
Tunisia’s origin/history dates to the Stone Age/Neolithic times and the nomadic
populations that were the settlers in the area were known as “Berbers”. As a result of the
occupation of the Berber lands by the Romans in AD 24, Christianity and Judaism was
the dominant religion in the area. Islam eventually gained influence in Tunisia after the
invasion of Arab Muslims, which was the most significant invasion in Tunisia’s history,
between AD 642 and AD 669 (Leaman, 2001). Many of the Christian population
converted to Islam and it became the principal religion of the region.
From the mid-sixteenth till the late nineteenth century, Tunisia was under the
charge of the Ottomans and the state-mosque relationship was predominantly structured
according to the religious sharia laws (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). The Ulema, who
were scholars of Islamic laws and theology, also occupied official positions and it gave
them the power to influence political directives (Green, 1976). In 1874, minister Khayr
al-Din Pasha established the Habous council which was a public organization charged
with overseeing properties owned by religious institutions, and the following year, he
created the Sadiki College where other languages like French and Italian were taught.
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Modern sciences and subjects such as astronomy, literature, and logic were also taught to
students (with diplomas awarded after course completion) and professors had to be
supervised which gave the state some power in the management of educational
institutions (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017).
According to Mounira Charrad (2001), there are three principal features of the
Tunisian society towards the end of French colonial rule. First, was the centralization and
development of state institutions through military reforms that strengthened the Tunisian
Army, the establishment of small-scale industries, tax reforms, the telegraph system, and
several others. Second, there were educational reforms that enabled the sustenance of
colleges where students were prepared in the skills of leadership and administration for
service to the government. The third feature was an administrative structure that could
connect and deliver information to farther regions/remote locations of the state, although
not every region accepted the mandates from the center and some openly opposed them
(Charrad, 2001).
Before Tunisia’s independence, the country was under the control of the colonial
power of France from 1881 till 1956. After World War I, several nationalist movements
represented by the Neo-Detour party emerged, and to maintain their control and curb
nationalist agitation, the French garnered the support of the Ulemas and religious
institutions by strengthening the power of Sharia law. This led to intense friction between
the nationalist Neo-Destour party headed by Habib Bourguiba and the Ulemas, and one
of the most notable disagreements that emerged as a result of this friction was the
naturalization crisis of 1932-1934 (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017).
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4.3.1 Gender Equity Status in Pre-Independence Tunisia
The period before Tunisia’s independence also saw the rise of several modernists
who contributed to the narrative on state-mosque relations in Tunisia. In 1930, Tahar
Haddad published his then-controversial text titled “Our Women in the Islamic Law and
Society” where he recommended a modernized understanding of the Quran and sharia
law that would forbid having more than one wife/husband and support protection of
female rights (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). His proposition was highly criticized by the
Ulema, and they sought to strip him of his degrees. Today, he is widely considered to be
the first Tunisian feminist and a national icon.
There is not a robust body of literature detailing the gender status of women in
Tunisia before independence and while the state was under French colonial rule, several
indications point that females were considered as belonging to the domestic sphere. Most
of the women were veiled, and illiterate due to a lack of access to education and under the
rulership of a male family member (i.e. brother, father, husband, etc.). It is doubtful that
this era in Tunisia experienced a feminist awakening or mass movements toward gender
equity which could be a result of the fundamentalist Islamic approach in practice.
4.4 Post-Independence State-Mosque Relations in Tunisia
4.4.1 Bourguiba’s Modernist Reform
The ten years after the attainment of independence from French colonialism in
1956 was characterized by the Bourguiba revolution which played a vital role in shaping
the structure between the state and Islam. The strategic aim of the then Prime Minister
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Habib Bourguiba (1957 - 1987) and The Neo-Destour party was to control, cripple and
undermine the power of religious institutions in Tunisia which had expanded due to
French colonial ambitions (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). The Sharia courts were banned
and, in its place, Bourguiba established a central civil law that was in line with the “code
civile” of France. There were a series of land, education, and legal reforms which left the
Ulema with little to no power, and Bourguiba was known for his radical denunciation of
the Ramadan fast faulting it as a cause for a decline in the productivity of the economy
(Boulby, 1988).
4.4.2 Gender Equity Status in Post-Independence Tunisia (Bourguiba)
This period after Tunisia’s independence marked a phenomenal turning point in
the quest for gender equity and women’s rights in Tunisia’s history. One of the most
important policies that were created after the Tunisian independence is the code of
personal status (CPS), also known as the Majalla. The code of personal status was
established on 13th August 1956, five months after securing its sovereignty from French
colonial rule, under the administration of the then prime minister Bourguiba by his
political agenda for modernization and secularization (Leaman, 2001).
The CPS bill served as an influential hallmark for women and gender equality in
Tunisia as women were now legally deemed equal to men on matters related to
ownership of property/assets, divorce, inheritance, and custodianship of children.
Although the CPS was a pioneer for gender equity among the Islamic states, it was not
engineered as a result of a mass feminine movement but rather as “an instrument of
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change, a way of bringing about a transformation in kinship patterns and family life,
which they saw as a necessary condition for broader social, political, and economic
changes.” (Encyclopedia, 2022).
Additionally, the 1959 Tunisian constitution gave women the right to vote and
contest elections along with instrumental rights regarding education and participation in
the labor force. Bourguiba’s government allocated substantial resources to the
educational sector to ensure that females had as much access to educational opportunities
as men. The average number of years spent by girls in school increased from 4.9 to 9.3
and 15.1 in 1971, 1990, and 2010, respectively (Mail, 2019). A 1983 Labor Code was
also created to provide women working in the public sector paid maternity leave and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was
ratified in 1985. These reforms and policies were established to ensure equal rights and
opportunities for all male and female citizens of Tunisia.
Tunisia’s code of personal status was criticized by some members of the Ulema
because it meant a loss of religious independence and decimation of the sharia law/court.
Fourteen of the Ulema issued a “fatwa” against the legislation but several of them were in
support and took up positions as guardians of the legislation. The CPS was also followed
by the anti-hijab crusade as hijabs were banned from being worn in the classroom by the
government. Bourguiba went as far as referring to hijabs as ‘rags’ and in his December
1957 speech in Sfax, he was quoted as saying;
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“If we understand that the middle-aged women are reticent about abandoning an
old habit, we can only deplore the stubbornness of parents who continue to oblige
their children to wear a veil in school. We even see civil servants going to work in
that odious rag. It has nothing to do with religion” (Boulby, 1988).
Despite these revolutionary religious reforms and strengthening of state power in
Tunisia, Bourguiba did not consider his actions as anti-Islamic but rather saw his actions
to be a modernist reformation of Islam (Boulby, 1988). According to Bourguiba in 1959,
“our concern is to return to the religion its dynamic quality” (Tessler, 1980). During the
movements and agitation for independence, Bourguiba made use of the Islamic
institutions and community to garner public support and towards the end of his rule, he
made attempts to tap into the religious community again, but he was unsuccessful due to
the intensity of his previous religious reforms (Tessler, 1980). Towards the late 1960s,
the Bourguiba modernist approach began losing its appeal and many questioned the
concreteness of its principles, and a revival of Islam was on the horizon (Boulby, 1988).
4.4.3 Ben Ali’s Islamic Reform
Preceding the illness of President Bourguiba and the eventual coup d’etat
orchestrated by Ben Ali, Tunisia experienced turbulent years of Islamic opposition and
movements against Bourguiba’s modernist reforms. Chief among the Islamic opposition
was “Le Mouvement De La Tendance Islamique” (MTI) which consisted of a group of
Sheiks led by Rached Ghannouchi, with a political objective to end the secular regime of
Bourguiba. Other Islamic revivalist organizations that contributed to the opposition
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included the Islamic Shura Party (ISP), the Islamic Vanguard (IV), the Islamic
Progressive Tendency (IPV), and the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) (Boulby, 1988).
The Islamic revival called for the propagation of Islamic-centered books, articles,
and media that would advocate for the return of Islam as the solution to the problems
facing the state. There were several violent protests against Bourguiba’s government,
particularly in 1978 and 1984 which stirred up discussions of a possible military
intervention and overthrow of the government. The climax of the Islamic Revolution was
the arrest of ninety Islamic activists including Rached Ghannouchi under charges of
conspiracy with Iran and attempted bomb attacks on Tunisia. Although Ghannouchi was
sentenced to mandatory labor for life, seven of the ninety accused were sentenced to die.
This led to an upheaval among the Tunisian Islamic revolutionists and threats from the
Islamic international community, the aftermath of which saw Bourguiba’s deposition by
Prime Minister Zinedine Ben Ali (Boulby, 1988).
Unlike Bourguiba’s strict reformist strategies, Ben Ali made use of Islam as a
means of gaining legitimacy among the people (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). The
modernist form of Islam Bourguiba practiced did not reflect significant growth in
Tunisia’s economy and many hoped that Ben Ali’s government would usher in a new
dawn for Tunisia’s economic and political development. The MTI while in Paris was
quoted to have described Ben Ali’s coup as a ‘positive and historic act’ (Boulby, 1988).
As a way of establishing his regime, Ben Ali made certain efforts to amass
support from the Islamic community and the population at large. He supported the
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broadcast of the five daily calls on radio and television, created a college for religious
study in 1989 (named it after the Zaytuna mosque), expanded the High Islamic Council
and the office of the Mufti, consulted with Islamic scholars on laws concerning Islam and
made the directorate of religious affairs an independent body separate from the office of
Prime Minister (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017).
Despite these efforts, the hope for an Islamic revival by the MTI under Ben Ali’s
rule was somewhat underachieved during his regime because although Ben Ali adopted
religion as a stance for his takeover and support of his regime, Islam and its institutions
were still under the control of the state government (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). The
university, Mufti, and members of the Higher Islamic council were all under the
supervision of the government. Ben Ali also oppressed Islamic movements and did not
permit absolute independence from the Islamic institutions.
This goes to show the importance of religion in most states and the difficulty
encountered when governments try to separate themselves from religious institutions.
Bourguiba fervently downplayed Islam and lost his office, while Ben Ali used religion as
a cover to gain legitimacy from the public. In the long run, they were both unable to
relinquish some independence to religious institutions as that would signify a loss of
power. Hence, both Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s regimes had weak state-mosque
relationships, and power was centralized to the state and not the Islamic bodies.
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4.4.4 Gender Equity Status in Post-Independence Tunisia (Ben Ali)
Tunisia’s position as a pacesetter on gender equity in MENA continued to
progress under Ben Ali’s leadership. The structures, policies, and institutions that were
constructed by former President Habib Bourguiba were not dismantled but rather
reinforced and maintained by Ben Ali’s administration. This political strategy to
empower women and create equal opportunities meant that the state had control over
what the Islam fundamentalists considered as ‘personal affairs’ that should remain in the
realm of Family/Sharia law and courts.
Ben Ali reflected his political stance on women’s rights by making several
reforms that promoted gender equity starting in 1988 when he established an electoral
law that prohibited discrimination by political parties. In 1992, Ben Ali created the
Secretariat of State for Women and Family, which popularly became known as the
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Family and Children, and the Elderly (MAFFEPA)
with the charge of organizing and supporting the government on matters related to
women’s equal opportunity. (Norbakk, 2016). The goal of MAFFEPA was also to ensure
that women were included in the political and public spaces or positions to make sure that
women are represented, and their voices are heard.
By 1993, Ben Ali reformed his predecessor (Habib Bourguiba) Code of Personal
Status to include greater protection of women’s rights. One of these rights enabled
women the ability to pass on their citizenship which meant that children born to Tunisian
women and fathers from a different country could become citizens of Tunisia. Another
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reform includes the right for women to maintain custody of children in the case of a
divorce. In 1997, the constitution was amended to mandate that political parties do not
show prejudice due to gender and there were also procedures set by Ben Ali’s
government to make provisions for larger participation of women in the political arena as
of 1999 (Mail, 2019).
Tunisia experienced a good deal of support from the international community
(particularly western powers like the United Kingdom, United States, and France) during
the course of Ben Ali’s leadership. This was largely a result of Ben Ali’s progressive
policies and structures that supported women’s rights and the increased women’s
participation in the workforce. It can be argued that just as Ben Ali used religion to gain
legitimacy from the Tunisian populace, he also used noticeable gender reforms to attain
clout, support, or resources from western powers and the international community at
large.
Under Ben Ali’s regime, there was a rise in women’s rights advocacy and
feminist organizations that placed pressure on the regime to make instrumental policies in
favor of women (Charrad, 2001). The table below consists of a list of women-centered
organizations that were very instrumental to the drive for gender equity in Tunisia.
Table 3: Women's Rights Organizations Post-independence
Time

Organization

Function

1956

National Union for Tunisian
Women (UNFT)

This group is the oldest and
largest organization founded
for women in Tunisia. In the
immediate post-independence
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era, UNFT was the most
outstanding voice for women
and had representation in most
regions including the remotest
parts of the country. * It has
formed alliances with
professional/special-interest
women’s groups and operates
in a framework of partnerships
with governmental structures
or national organizations (i.e.
in tackling illiteracy).
1978/197
9

Club Tahar El Haddad**d’études
de la condition de la femme
(CECF)

This organization was founded
by elite educated women such
as executives, teachers,
journalists, lawyers, students,
etc. The group addressed
women’s complaints
concerning their limited
advances in political
participation and made
demands for further rights.

1983

Union of Tunisian Workers
‘women’s commission’ (UGTT)

The organization was birthed
at a round table organized by
CECF.

1985

The Nissa Group

They established a bi-monthly
journal to tackle issues related
to women in Tunisia. Its
objectives included the
protection of the CPS,
advocating for women’s
political participation, and
shining a light on the role of
women’s hidden work. Eight
issues were published between
1985 and 1987.

1985

Tunisian League for Human rights LTDH was a Tunisian
(LTDH)
women’s commission founded
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in 1985.
1989

Tunisian Women’s Association
for Research and Development
(AFTURD)

Built after the political
liberalization in 1987,
AFTURD served as a response
to requests from multiple
women’s organizations and
was composed of female
academics. Its major role was
to perform research on the
means to integrate women in
economic and social
development. The organization
also has a broader societal
agenda with a focus on
women’s conditions.

1989

Tunisian Association of Women
Democrats (ATFD)

The ATFP was formed after
the Copenhagen convention by
Arab-Muslim women. The
ATFD takes political, social
and cultural measures to
defend, consolidate and
develop women’s rights at
times where attempts are made
to curtail them.

Source: (Chambers and Cummings 2014, 25) Chambers, V., & Cummings, C. (2016).
Building momentum: Women's empowerment in Tunisia. ODI.
https://odi.org/en/publications/building-momentum-womens-empowerment-in-tunisia/
4.5 State-Mosque Relations after the 2011 Tunisian Revolution
The 2011 Tunisian revolution saw an overwhelming breakdown of the Tunisian
authoritarian state government which had existed for several decades under the leadership
46

of Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. This collapse of Tunisia’s government meant that there
was a vacuum of power that needed to be filled to run the administration of the country.
This led to different phases of leadership that experienced tussles between the state and
the mosque.
The first government that arose out of the upheaval caused by the Tunisian
revolution was the Caid Essebsi government which instituted Laroussi Missouri as the
religious affairs minister. In the era of this government, there was little to no supervision
of the religious institutions and the state lost its control over the activities of the mosques.
Several political meetings were being held at mosques and most of the state’s mosque
Imams were replaced with Islamic fundamentalist activists (Donker & Netterstrom,
2017).
The next government that took over from Essebi was the Troika government
consisting of members of the Islamist Ennahda Movement. A major challenge
experienced by this government was in the drafting of a new constitution. While the
modernist parties did not want Sharia included in the new constitution, Islamic
fundamentalists wanted the constitution to mention Islam as the fundamental form of
decision/policy making (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). The Troika government was quite
hesitant to pick a side due to concerns about the reactions of the Tunisian populace and
the international community. The solution to this dilemma was decided by the MTI
leader, Ghannouchi, who supported the previous structure of the constitution, where
Islam is stated as the religion of Tunisia and remains the same.
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The interim government of Mehdi Jomaa tried to have a clearer stance on the
distinction between the state and the mosque. Joma named Mounir Tlili as the religious
affairs minister and from the onset, Tlili announced that the religious institutions would
have their independence and their activities would not be under the scrutiny of the state
government. This proclamation was however short-lived as Tlili changed his position and
he made several attempts to retain state control over the mosques by closely observing
the mosque, supervising its charitable activities, interfering with the appointment of
Imams, and monitoring sermons in mosques (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017). The
subsequent National Unity government in Tunisia did not fall far from its predecessor as
the then-new minister of religious affairs, Othman Battikh, maintained that the state
should control the activities of the mosque. The difference between Tlili and Battikh was
that while Tlili bowed to pressures for state control, Battikh saw the state as the
legitimate overseer of the mosque due to its neutrality (Donker & Netterstrom, 2017).
4.5.1 Gender Equity Status after the Tunisian Revolution
The 2011 revolution in Tunisia ushered in a new change to the perspective of
gender equity and support for women’s rights. While the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes
were characterized by authoritarian rule, there was now support for the rule of the
majority and other voices previously quietened by the previous regimes now had the
opportunity to express their views on policies made in the past and to put them to the test.
The result of this was that the people in Tunisia had more freedom of expression
to react and reveal their personal feelings/ideologies in the face of unwelcome social or
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political change (Mail, 2019). For instance, under the Bourguiba regime, women were not
permitted to don a hijab in government or any educational institutions, but after the 2011
revolution, several women wore the hijab as a method of stating their religious stance and
ownership of their voice. This also points to the authoritarian rule in Tunisia that existed
before the 2011 revolution and it is interesting to note that despite Bourguiba’s milestone
towards gender equity with the Code of Personal Status, he still made rules that were
detrimental to the rights women possess over their bodies and choice of outfit. It can be
argued that Bourguiba’s somewhat obsession with maintaining state control over the
mosque, outweighed his commitment to women’s rights and equity.
Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s sustenance of the CPS was a welcome development that
remained after the 2011 revolution. The credit for this lies largely with the womencentered organizations, activists, and female members of the National Assembly, who
ensured that the CPS was not discarded or under-enforced due to the state-mosque tussle
for power in the aftermath of the revolution. It was very likely that Tunisia could have
retracted to its pre-independence era where Family Law was the supreme deciding power
in matters relating to women’s rights. The ruling party of the time, Ennahda, were also
standing in support of the CPS and stated their commitment to ensuring that the policies
of the CPS were maintained (Mail, 2019).
Tunisia’s 2014 constitution also honored the CPS policy by ensuring that there
were provisions available to ensure that the policies are effective and reach the target
areas. Women were also included in the constitutional drafting process but found it
difficult to arrive at a consensus on the best approach to expanding women’s rights in
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Tunisia. Despite the friction, members of the NCA worked together to ensure that the
2014 ratified constitution mandated the state to provide protection to women against
violence and guarantee harassment-free working conditions for women (Mail, 2019).
Article 1 of the constitution still maintained that Islam was the religion of Tunisia,
but it did not mention sharia in its context which prevents differing translations of Sharia
law that could possess prohibitive rules defining the responsibility of females in the
family (Mail, 2019). There was also a debate around the use of ‘complementarity’ rather
than ‘equality’ in the proposed draft of Article 28 which read as follows; “The State
assures the protection of women’s rights and gains, following the principle of
complementarity with the man within the family and as partners with him in the
development of the homeland”. This debate led to mass protest of the proposed draft
championed by influential women's rights associations like the Tunisian League of
Human rights, the Tunisian Association of Women Democrats (ATFD), and the Tunisian
Women’s Association for Research and Development (AFTURD). The protests and
efforts of these organizations led to the terminology of equality among males and females
to be included in Article 22 (Mail, 2019).
In this chapter, I have analyzed the different regimes, methods of rulership, and
the gender outlook for Tunisian women within the four-time periods of preindependence, and post-independence (Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali regime), and the
aftermath of the 2011 revolution. This chapter also reflects the transition from colonial to
authoritarian and democratic control of Tunisia including the scuffle for power between
the state and the mosque (Islamic modernists and Islamic fundamentalists). Tunisia has
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certainly been on a rollercoaster when balancing power between the state and the mosque
but despite this, Tunisia remains a pioneer and hallmark of gender equity in the Middle
East North Africa due to its commitment to inclusivity and continued activism for
women’s rights.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION
This research has investigated the connection between state-mosque relations and
gender equity through the lens of a historical case study analysis of Tunisia’s trajectory
towards gender equity. Tunisia has been through different regime changes since
independence and each regime denied the Islamic institutions full autonomy despite
declaring Islam as the state’s religion in the constitution. In support of my hypothesis,
states’ support and prioritization of Muslim/sharia law over federal law is a major
contributor to gender inequity within the Middle East North African states. I found that
the weaker the state-mosque relationship was in Tunisia, the stronger gender equity
improved. A major instance where this was reflected is seen in the state government’s
refusal to address fundamentalist opposition to the creation of Tunisia’s code of personal
status.
One of the major hallmarks of my discovery while conducting this research is that
ever since Tunisia attained independence, most of its leaders have fought to keep state
control over the Islamic institutions. Presently, the constitution of Tunisia still outlines
Islam as the religion of the state, but it seems like, the leaders that have governed Tunisia
since its independence preferred to use religion as a cover to gain legitimacy from the
fundamentalist populace than to grant Islamic institutions their autonomy. This began
with the fervent Bourguiba revolution that was aimed to debilitate the powers religious
institutions had gained under the French occupation and this separation of state from
mosque has continued ever since.
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A possible explanation for this would be that the French colonialists made use of
the authority of the Islamic leaders to maintain the power structure they created by
establishing an indirect rule system. In this system, the Islamic institutions held
administrative and legal responsibilities under the supervision and directive of the
colonialists. France also administered this system in Algeria, as well as other colonial
rulers like Britain in Nigeria, Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the Dutch in the
East Indies, etc. In this case, the end of French colonial rule could have been interpreted
as the end of Islamic control by the people who may have grown to consider the French
and Muslim leaders synonymous.
The case study analysis conducted in chapter four describes the continued
opposition against most ruling regimes by the Islamic fundamentalists. Most
advancements toward gender equity were followed by a backlash from the Islamic
community. The most remarkable policy that launched Tunisia's trajectory towards
gender equity, the Code of Personal Status, was widely criticized by some Islamic
scholars (or Ulemas) for going outside the doctrines of the sharia law. It can be argued
that their resistance stemmed from a dread that the CPS provision for women’s rights
meant a further loss of control of the personal/domestic lives of the people which had
formerly been governed by Sharia law.
Another discovery of importance I observed is that the stronger gender reform
policies were strengthened and promoted, the more Tunisia experienced growth in
women's organizations and mass movements. As reflected in Table 3 (Women's Rights
Organizations Post-independence), there was a noticeable increase in the number of
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women-centered organizations in Ben Ali's administration than there was under Habib
Bourguiba. An important point of connection to also note is that the growth of these
organizations placed pressure on each regime to sponsor gender-equitable policies.
After the 2011 Tunisian revolution and the amendment of the constitution began,
women’s rights associations were instrumental in lobbying for changes to the language of
the constitution which would work to progress gender equity in the state. Notable of these
organizations are the Tunisian League of Human rights, the Tunisian Association of
Women Democrats (ATFD), and the Tunisian Women’s Association for Research and
Development (AFTURD). This would imply that state governments need to focus on
supporting and funding the growth of women's rights organizations to achieve gender
equity. It is also not enough to support and fund them, there needs to be adequate space at
the policy-making table for these organizations to air their opinions and contribute to
decision-making in every state.
In my analysis, I also find that less authoritarian regimes breed stronger growth in
women's rights in Tunisia. Despite Bourguiba's revolutionary Code of Personal Status, I
argue that under his authoritarian rule there were still actions taken by his administration
that could be considered detrimental to women's rights. One shining example of this was
his anti-hijab crusade which advocated for the wearing of hijabs by females to be banned
in public spaces, such as the classrooms and government workspaces (Boulby, 1988). His
crusade negates the essential human rights to freedom, expression, and choice, without
which gender equity cannot be accomplished. It seems Bourguiba's resolve against
religious institutions was stronger than his goal for gender equity which he reflected in
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the CPS. Perhaps Tunisia could have made greater accomplishments in gender equity in
that era if Bourguiba had taken a more democratic than authoritarian stance when
addressing religious issues.
Acceptance from the international community and support from other countries
was also a motivator that fueled the advancement of gender equity in Tunisia. As Tunisia
made instrumental improvements to gender equity policies, it received more recognition
and support from countries that were also policy-driven toward gender equity. Countries
like the United States, United Kingdom, and France, their former colonial power, were
very vocal in their support and admiration for Tunisia. Currently, United Nations Women
are working closely with the Tunisian government and citizens to continue prioritizing
social justice and inclusivity in the state (UN Women, 2022).
One of the hopes of the 2011 Tunisian revolution was to bring in a revival of
Islamic fundamentalism but the reverse was the case as Tunisia grew to be more secular
than it was in previous regimes. At present, Tunisia is considered to be the most secular
state in Middle East North Africa. Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali had an authoritarian
system of government that strongly resisted Islamic autonomy and with the 2011
revolution, Islamic fundamentalist parties perceived an avenue to fill the power vacuum
but despite their efforts, they never fully had a representative that strengthened the statemosque relationship or delegated authority to the Sharia law/courts.
As Raymond Carver rightly quoted, “I’m always learning something. Learning
never ends”, I too believe that learning, unlearning, and relearning should be a principle
55

of life for all seeking knowledge and wisdom. With this principle in mind, I believe that
further research and testing on the relationship between states and their religious
institutions and how it affects gender equity in other states within MENA will be very
beneficial. By testing this theory in other states, we will be able to reflect patterns in
gender equity by observing when state-mosque relations are at the strongest and weakest
times. Until we get to the goal of gender equity, it is important to keep digging beneath
the surface of this subject matter and continually seek knowledge that will help create
solutions and advance policy strategies to meet this objective.
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